Uber, Fraud and Limitation: The Cost of Waiting

Background

In a decision handed down on 19 October 2026, the High Court determined, on a trial of a preliminary issue on limitation, that claims brought against Uber by over 13,000 taxi drivers were time-barred and should be dismissed.

The claimants had brought claims in unlawful means conspiracy on the basis that companies in the Uber group had deliberately and dishonestly concealed the manner in which their business operated and made false representations to Transport for London (“TfL”) as to their operations in order to obtain a private hire vehicle operator’s licence.  The claimants alleged that, but for the alleged dishonesty and concealment, Uber would not have secured a licence to operate in London, thereby competing with the claimants and costing them business. Uber denied the allegations.

The claims were issued in May and June 2024, and it was common ground between the parties that the limitation period from the date of accrual of the claimants’ right of action had already expired by this date.  However, the claimants maintained, relying on section 32(1)(a) and (b) of the Limitation Act 1980 (“Section 32”), that they had neither discovered, nor could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the alleged fraud and/or concealment until a reasonable period after the redetermination of Uber’s licensing application by Westminster Magistrates Court in June 2018. They accordingly maintained that limitation ran for six years from that date. Uber argued that the claimants had discovered, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, all of the relevant facts by no later than December 2017 when TfL’s detailed decision letter refusing to renew Uber London’s licence (the “TfL Decision Letter”) was made publicly available.

As this was a trial of a preliminary issue, the court proceeded on the basis that the conspiracy, fraud and concealment alleged by the claimants had occurred, although it made no factual determination in this regard.

Decision

The court found that the claims were time-barred on the basis that publicly available material, particularly the TfL Decision Letter, provided sufficient information to plead the claims by February 2018 at the latest.

Analysis

Section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980

Under Section 32, where an action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or any fact relevant to the claimant’s right to claim is deliberately concealed from them by the defendant, the start of the limitation period is postponed until a claimant discovers, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered, the relevant fraud or deliberate concealment.

To assess the claimants’ knowledge of the alleged fraud, the court applied the “statement of claim test”, which asks whether the claimant had, or could with reasonable diligence have obtained, sufficient knowledge properly to plead a claim that would not be struck out as unarguable or lacking sufficient evidential basis.  For deliberate concealment, the court applied the “worthwhile claim test”, which asks whether the claimant knew, or could with reasonable diligence have known, enough about the concealment to justify embarking on the preliminaries to proceedings. The court observed that there is usually little practical difference between the two tests.

While fraud is subject to stricter pleading requirements than other claims and allegations of fraud must be clear, sufficiently particularised and supported by reasonably credible material, this proved to be of limited assistance to the claimants in this case. The court drew a distinction between having enough information to properly plead fraud and having sufficient evidence to establish it at trial. For example, the primary facts to be pleaded must justify an inference of dishonesty rather than mere negligence, however, they need not be consistent only with dishonesty but must make an inference of dishonesty more likely than one of innocence or negligence.

Accordingly, the claimants did not need an express finding of dishonesty against Uber to plead their case: all they needed were facts from which dishonesty could be inferred and pleaded. For example, the TfL Decision Letter described Uber’s explanations of its booking processes as “precise, but false”. It was held that, based on this, the claimants could have pleaded an inference that Uber understood its own systems and therefore knew that its explanations were misleading. Further evidence may have strengthened this allegation, but no new factual foundation was necessary to be able to plead the claim.

The court emphasised that the six-year limitation period is there to investigate a claim and decide whether to pursue it; it does not start only once that fact-finding exercise has been completed.

“Reasonable diligence”

The court explained that the requirement for “reasonable diligence” on the part of the claimant applies both to identifying that something should be investigated and to the pursuit of that investigation. Accordingly, it was irrelevant if the particular claimant had not become aware of the relevant issue and thus had not taken any steps to investigate it, provided that they could, with reasonable diligence, have become aware. Personal lack of interest or a preference to await developments did not prevent the limitation period from starting to run.

Limitation and privilege

When a claimant wishes to rely on Section 32 to defeat a limitation defence, the evidential burden is on the claimant to show that they could not have discovered the relevant fraud and/or concealment. The court noted that it may be difficult for a claimant who has received legal advice to successfully rely on Section 32 without being prepared to waive privilege in that advice in order to show their state of knowledge at the relevant time. The court noted that there was no obligation to waive privilege and that no adverse inferences could be drawn from a refusal to do so. Nonetheless, this is an important consideration for a claimant seeking to rely on this section.

No waiver of privilege was given in this case, at least in part because the relevant privilege in one instance belonged to a litigation funder and not to the claimants. Ultimately, the issue of waiver of privilege was not determinative in this case given the nature of the information which was in the public domain at the relevant time, but it could prove crucial in different circumstances.

Comment

This decision highlights that the limitation period may begin before a claimant considers litigation commercially attractive: waiting for further evidence, stronger advice on the merits or litigation funding may leave claimants exposed to a limitation defence. Prospective claimants should therefore assess limitation early and take a conservative view on issuing proceedings where there is uncertainty. Claimants should also be wary of relying too heavily upon the higher standard of pleading for allegations of fraud, which can be of limited assistance.

For defendants, this case underlines the value of a limitation defence, particularly in cases where there is a lot of material related to issues in the public domain.